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Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the 
Direct Tax Clauses 
Erik M. Jensen * 
Try a thought experiment. Imagine delegate Bruce Ackerman, a supporter of 
the draft Constitution, speaking to the Connecticut ratifying convention in 1788. 
He is asked whether the Constitution provides any significant limitation on the 
power of Congress to impose as-yet-unknown forms of taxation. Ackerman 
answers, "No, of course not. " Suppos-e a foresighted delegate asks a more specific 
question: ''Does the Constitution impose any serious limitation on the power of 
Congress to tax individuals on their incomes?" Ackerman again answers, "No, of 
course not. " 
If the draft Constitution had been generally understood to reflect a taxing 
power so broad and unconstrained, would it have been ratified? No, of course 
not. Any conception of original understanding that suggests otherwise is 
nonsense. Whatever we think the law is or should be today, we ought not use 
·twentieth-century (or twenty-first-century) political goals as devices to interpret 
eighteenth-century thought. 
In "Taxation and the Constitution," an article published in the 
January 1999 issue of the Columbia Law Review, Professor Bruce 
Ackerman challenges my interpretation of the direct-tax clauses in the 
Constitution, those provisions requiring that "direct taxes" be 
apportioned among the states on the basis ofpopulation. 1 In an earlier 
issue of the same Review, I argued that those clauses had coherence in 
1787,2 and that they remain relevant today.3 Although Professor 
Ackerman devotes several pages to the project, his rebuttal 
(concentrated in a subsection titled "How Not to Read the Direct Tax 
*David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I thank jon Entin for 
many helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
2 Relevant constitutional language is set out in an Appendix. The direct-tax clauses are found in U.S. 
CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3, and art. I,§ 9, cl. 4. 
3 See Erik M.Jensen, The Apportionment of"Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 
COLUM. L. REv. 2334 (1997). You could not tell it from Ackerman's critique, but my answer was, in 
the case of indirect consumption taxes like a value-added tax (VAT) or a national sales tax, Yes. 
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Clauses"4) is little more than a flick of the hand: How did this fly get in 
here? 
Professor Ackerman advocates a wealth tax that is problematic if the 
direct-tax clauses retain any force. 5 No problem. With a clash between 
constitutional text and Professor Ackerman's policy goals, constitutional 
text must give way. Ackerman has "social justice" and the "American 
People" on his side; I do not. And so on. 
Worst of all, I was "enterprising," searching for some decomposing 
corpse to disinter: 
[ G] enerations of academic neglect of the constitutional 
issues makes [sic] it easy for enterprising scholars to 
"rediscover" the "direct tax" clauses, and urge their 
resuscitation without serious consideration of their 
origins in slavery, or the historical response by the 
American People to Pollock's wrong-headed effort to 
expand their scope in the aftermath of the Civil War. 
Professor Jensen's recent contribution to this Review may 
serve, I am sorry to say, as an example of this genre.6 
I should have left interpretation of constitutional matters to the Grand 
Theorists at Yale, who generally avoid the racism that taints my article7 
and who are never enterprising. I should also have allowed, indeed we 
should all allow, "the 'direct tax' clauses to rest in peace."8 
4 See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 52-56. 
5 See id. at 56-58; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALsTOTI, THE STAKEHOLDER SOC!ElY ( 1999). 
6 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 52. Hey, he only said that it may serve as an example of this genre. 
(What genre? What other examples does Ackerman have in mind?) 
7 Yalies can advance racist positions, but only inadvertently. I made the horrible mistake of 
citing a work by Professor Owen Fiss that takes· Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & TrUJt Co., 157 U.S. 429 
(1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (the Income Tax Cases), seriously. See OWEN FISS, HISTORYOFTHE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1988-1910, 
at 75-100 ( 1993). Fiss did not argue that the direct-tax clauses' "origins in slavery" automatically 
invalidate the clauses, but Ackerman says he should have. It was "an odd lapse for a scholar who has 
done so much to liberate our law from its legacy of racism." Ackerman, supra note 1, at 30 n.112. 
Fiss nodded, but he has a good heart. Apparently I do not. Professor Ackerman accuses me of 
using Fiss's "reputation" as "a screen to rehabilitate Pollock." !d. What I did was use Fiss's work, not 
his reputation, and it was hardly a "screen." Moreover, Ackerman expects the reader to infer that 
my work should be disregarded because I am indifferent to the "legacy of racism." Please excuse me 
if I am outraged personally and professionally by these suggestions. 
8 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 3. 
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Oh, yes, I was "intemperate,"9 too. 
Life is too short to respond to all the problems in Professor 
Ackerman's article. Instead, I will concentrate on the worst ones. I will 
focus first on t.~e original undersianding of the direct-tax clauses. I 
might not have everything right, but I have come a lot closer than 
Professor Ackerman has. I will then explain why the direct-tax clauses' 
original connection with slavery, lam en table as it is, 10 does not justify 
nullification of the clauses. I will briefly comment on interpreting the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which exempts "taxes on incomes" from the 
apportionment requirement. Finally, I will point out an astonishing 
implication of Ackerman's article. 
I. ACKERMAN AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
Professor Ackerman argues that "direct taxes," if the term was 
comprehended at all, was originally understood to include only 
capitation taxes and real-esiate taxes; anything else, like the income tax 
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1895,ll was not meant to be 
subject to the apportionment requirement.I2 With the uniformity rule 
limited to geographical uniformity,B the Constitution, as originally 
ratified, was intended to place no serious limiiations on the taxing 
power. 
The idea that the founding generation was reconciled to an 
unlimited, or nearly unlimited, taxing power is wishful thinking, a 
warping of historical undersianding. Of course the Constitution created 
a national revenue power; that was a critically important reason for the 
Constitution's coming into being. But Professor Ackerman's leap from 
that premise to his conclusion would give Evel Knievil pause. 
Lest we forget, the Articles of Confederation left the "national" 
government to rely (often unsuccessfully) on requisitions to meet 
revenue needs. What seems today to be a very modest power, levying 
9 Id. at 53. 
10 Despite my supposed support for the "legacy of racism," see supra note 7, I do not favor 
slavery. Really. And I have voted for a few Democrats, apparently a critical requirement for 
academic discourse. Cf Ackerman, supra note 1, at 6 (noting the existence of"liberal Democrats-
among whom I am happy to be numbered"). 
11 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
12 See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 6-25. 
13 The rule provides that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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imposts, was in fact a dramatic increase in the national government's 
capabilities. In urging ratification of the Constitution,James Wilson (a 
major participant at the Constitutional Convention14) noted that the 
power to impose imposts was "not given by the present Articles of 
Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of the United 
States will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most 
productive method of raising revenue." 15 With many of the 
Constitution's strongest supporters stressing how significant a change 
merely permitting imposts would be- not surprising, considering that a 
war had just been fought over taxation - Professor Ackerman would 
nevertheless have us believe that the founders intended an unlimited 
taxing power. 16 
The ratification of the Constitution was not a foregone conclusion. 
How could Professor Ackerman's Constitution have been ratified? 17 
Why was there so much discussion in the ratification debates about 
14 He was also a member of the Supreme Court in Hylton v. United Stales, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 
(1796), the first case to consider the scope of the direct-tax rule. See Jensen, supranote3, at2350-63; 
infra notes 17, 25, 30, 35. 
15 James Wilson, Speech (Pa. Convention, Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in FRlENDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: WRJTINGSOFTHE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS 1787-1788,231,245 (Colleen A Sheehan & 
Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998) [hereinafter FruENDS). 
16 Professor Ackerman admits that the founders thought taxes on articles of consumption 
would satisfy the nation's revenue needs, except during war, but he says "this expectation about the 
typical use of federal powers should not be confused with a reasoned judgment about the scope of 
power granted by the constitutional texL" Ackerman, supra note 1, at 54 n.218. But constitutional 
text ought to be interpreted in light of its purposes; that is part of the "reasoned judgment" we 
make. If we care about original understanding- and I understand that not everyone does- how 
can we not pay attention to the expectations of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution? 
That is what original understanding is. 
17 I have no doubt that a few Federalists, particularly Alexander Hamilton, believed the taxing 
power should be unlimited. Some numbers of The Federalist contain very broad language. See, e.g., 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 156-61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 35, at 179-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). But even 
Hamilton noted limitations when he was marketing the Constitution; he had a sense of what was 
politically acceptable. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999); see also infra text accompanying note 31 (quoting relevant language). When 
Hamilton was using his broadest language, it was in support of "permitting the national government 
to raise its own revenue by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered 
constitution of civil government," THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, supra, at 157, which is not an argument in 
favor of the constitutionality of every form of tax that Professor Ackerman can come up with. 
[n any event, it is hardly the case that all Federalists promoted unlimited taxing power. For 
example, James Madison, a not insignificant player in 1787, believed the carriage tax at issue in 
Hylton v. United Stales, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 ( 1796), was unconstitutional. See4ANNALS OF CONGRESS 
730 ( 1794) (arguing that carriage tax would "break down one of the safeguards of the 
Constitution"). 
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taxation, with Federalists stressing the limits on the taxing power, if it 
was generally understood that the power was unbounded?l8 
Professor Ackerman discusses original understanding, but his heart is 
not in the project. He clearly does not think it should be important to 
constitutional interpretation, and, in any case, his ultimate point does 
not depend on the thought of the founders: 
Since the epic struggle between Franklin Roosevelt and 
the Old Court, the judiciary has consistently upheld 
democratic efforts to take control of the economy in 
pursuit of social justice. Under the constitutional 
regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no 
significant limits on the national government's taxing, 
spending, and regulatory power where the economy is 
concerned other than the requirement that 
government compensate owners if their property is 
taken for public purposes. 19 
As a result, "[r] ather than looking anxiously over their shoulders at the 
Founders' 'direct tax' provisions, modern-day reformers should be 
focusing on a single objective- to convince the American People of the 
twenty-first century of the justice of their cause."20 They should not have 
to worry about trivia like the direct-tax clauses, which, together with the 
Income Tax Cases, "should be dispatched into the dustbin of 
constitutional history. "21 
Professor Ackerman accurately describes modern reality. Putting 
18 At times, Professor Ackerman seems to suggest that the founding debates on taxation were 
window dressing; the direct-tax clauses were for show, to satisfY folks back home while having no 
substantive effect. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra. note I, at 10 (stating that direct-tax clause introduced 
by Gouverneur Morris "offered symbolic satisfaction - by continuing to link taxation and 
representation, it served as a fig-leaf for anti-slavery Northerners"); id. at 19 (stating that the "appeal 
to 'direct' taxation was merely a piece of statesmanly rhetoric aimed at avoiding the disastrous 
dissolution of the Founding dream"- "a way of getting to yes"). But the ratification debates make 
no sense if nothing substantive was thought to be at stake. If Ackerman's point is that some 
founders made public statements they did not believe in, so as to hoodwink the public, surely it is 
the public statements, not the hidden thoughts, that should guide our understanding of 
constitutional meaning. 
19 ld. at 3. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 51. 
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aside special situations, like those governed by the Export Clause,22 I 
have little doubt that Congress can do almost anything in the taxarea.23 
In fact, I wrote that "it is hard to imagine a federal court's invalidating a 
taxing scheme of far-reaching import. "24 Regardless of constitutional 
text and original understanding, that is the way things are. 
But coming to that conclusion should not require garbling history. I 
understand Professor Ackerman's desire to convince devotees of original 
understanding that they are wrong on their own terms. Nevertheless, 
Ackerman's characterization of original understanding makes sense only 
if we believe that 1999 sensibilities were in ascendance in North America 
in the late eighteenth century. Ackerman cares so much about the 
result that he is willing to trample history and common sense on the way 
to his goai.25 
And Professor Ackerman does notfollow just one path. He is a 
master at arguing in the alternative, which works better for legal practice 
than it does for scholarship. When it suits Ackerman's purposes, he 
argues that the term "direct taxes" was clearly enough defined; it was 
intended to encompass only capitation taxes and real-estate taxes. At 
22 
"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 
5. I will ignore the Export Clause for present purposes,just as I assume that Professor Ackerman's 
broad statements about the taxing power are not meant to suggest that the Export Clause is a dead 
letter. The Supreme Court has decided two Export Clause cases recently. See United States v. 
United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998); United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 
U.S. 843 (1996); see alroAckerman, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing Export Clause). 
23 It is congressional power we are concerned with, although Ackerman, like tax-bashing 
Americans, seems to think the Internal Revenue Service is responsible for the Internal Revenue 
Code. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that "the modem IRS would undoubtedly encounter 
a lot of anger if it tried to impose different tax rates on citizens living in different states," a 
proposition that is either trivially true or hopelessly muddled). 
24 Jensen, supra note 3, at 2414. 
25 The importance of the result- do not limit the taxing power!- is apparent from Professor 
Ackerman's praise for the work of Professor Calvin Johnson, who has also written an article on 
direct taxation. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the 
Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 ( 1999). Ackerman and Johnson agree on the absurdity of 
the direct-tax clauses, but on little else. See Ackerman, supra note I, at 15 n.SO (takingJohnson to 
task). Johnson thinks that (I) as originally understood, "direct taxes" had a meaning- it included 
all taxes except imposts - that is far broader than my understanding of the term, and therefore 
several orders of magnitude beyond Ackerman's, and (2) the Supreme Court in Hylton v. United 
States, a decision described by Ackerman as an example of 'judicial restraint," id. at 53, dispensed 
with the direct-tax rules on cy pres grounds. Nevertheless, writes Ackerman, "[t]hese differences in 
approach ... should not obscure our convergence on a common doctrinal conclusion- indeed, this 
fact is itself significant, since constitutional doctrine greatly gains in stability if it can be buttressed by 
many different, but ultimately complementary, arguments." I d. at 2 n.l. These diametric positions 
are doctrinally "complementary" in only one way- result. 
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other times, he suggests that there was nothing coherent enough in the 
direct-tax clauses to justify any restraints on congressional taxing power. 
In his words, "the apportionment rule ... was, from the very beginning, 
understood to be a constitutional anomaly."26 That was so because 
"[t]he Founders didn't have a very clear sense ofwhat they were doing 
in carving out a distinct category of 'direct taxes' for special 
treatment."27 The clauses were not put into the Constitution "to 
crystallize some hard-won truth of political economy"; 28 it was "political 
expediency, not economic principle, that was driving the Framers."29 
Neither of those paths is worth following. Of course it is true that not 
everything was perfectly thought out, that the level of economic 
understanding among the founders was not great by modem standards, 
that not all founders were reading from the same page in all debates 
about the taxing power. The direct-tax clauses therefore have fuzzy 
edges. But, as inconvenient as they may be, the clauses are in the 
Constitution, and we should try to make sense of constitutional text if we 
can, even provisions that we do not like. Moreover, we have an 
obligation as interpreters to try to understand text in its most robust 
form, not to trivialize it. That is what I did with the direct-tax 
apportionment clauses. Because the rules have been ignored for so 
long, I wanted to see if there was some sense to them. Did they have a 
legitimate purpose, or did the 1796 Supreme Court decision in Hylton v. 
United States properly leave tl1e clauses with a minor role?30 
26 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 23. He resurrects Rufus King's unanswered question at the 
Constitutional Convention ("Mr King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No 
one answd.", 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 350 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966) (Aug. 20, 1787) [hereinafter FARRAND], as if the silence proves the clauses' lack of 
principled content. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at ll ("Given its troubled origins in the 
compromise with slavery, the silence is perfectly understandable."). But see Jensen, supra note 3, at 
2377-79 (noting, among other things, that King himself had a sense of what "direct taxes" were). 
27 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 4. 
28 ld. at 19. 
29 I d. at 4. 
30 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (upholding unapportioned tax on carriages and suggesting, in dictum, 
that only direct taxes are capitation taxes and real-estate taxes). I hasten to add that this minor role is not 
trivial. A federal real-estate tax would still presmnably (dare I use that word?, see infra notes 50.51 and 
accompanying text) be subject to apportionment. SeeHelveringv. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 
378 (1934) ("If the statute lays taxes on the part of the building occupied by the owner or upon the 
rental value of that space, it cannot be sustained, for that would be to lay a direct tax requiring 
apportionment. ... The rental value of the building used by the owner does not constitute income 
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."). But see Ackerman, supra note I, at 58 
(suggesting that real-estate taxation should not be limited by direct-tax clauses today). 
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That is an academic exercise; it is what academics do. And the 
answer to the first question is, Yes, the clauses had a reasonable purpose. 
A. Definition of "Direct Taxes" 
On the basis of constitutional text and an examination of 
constitutional debates, I argued that the Constitution in its original form 
generally divided the universe of taxes into two large groups: direct taxes 
subject to the apportionment rule, and indirect taxes subject to the 
uniformity rule. It was a division that had coherence; it reflected the 
"nature of things" as the founders understood that nature. Indirect 
taxes, generally taxes on articles of consumption, have built-in 
protections against abuse by governments. In contrast, direct taxes were 
a special concern precisely because such taxes do not contain natural 
limitations on their use. 
Here is the basic point, from Hamilton's The Federalist No. 21: 
Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties on 
articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, 
which will, in time, find its level with the means of 
paying them .... 
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of 
consumption, that they contain in their own nature a 
security against excess. They prescribe their own limit, 
which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end 
proposed - that is, an extension of the revenue .... 
This forms a complete barrier against any material 
oppression of the citizens by the taxes of this class, and 
is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing 
them. 
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the 
denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long 
time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in 
this country. Those of the direct kind, which 
principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a 
rule of apportionment. . . . In a branch of taxation where no 
limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the 
nature of the thing, the establishment of a fixed rule, not 
1999] Taxation and the Constitution 
incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer 
inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large.3 1 
The "fixed rule" is the direct-tax apportionment rule. 
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There is more than a little sense to this constitutional structure: cabin 
the potentially abusive taxes, and leave i:he safe ones alone, requiring 
only that they be geographically uniform. As did nearly all significant 
founders, James Wilson extolled the virtues ofindirect taxation- taxes 
on articles of consumption. Indirect taxation is safe "because it is 
voluntary. No one is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and 
each buys only in proportion to his consumption. The price of the 
commodity is blended with the tax, and the person is often not sensible 
of the payment."32 In contrast, those taxes that are unsafe, or potentially 
unsafe, need to be limited. Hence the apportionment rule, which made 
direct taxes difficult, but not impossible, to impose.33 
That structure should inform our understanding of what "direct 
taxes" are. Yes, Hamilton referred in The Federalist No. 21 to direct taxes 
as "principally" relating to taxes on land and buildings, to go with the 
capitation taxes that the Constitution is explicit about.34 It is not 
surprising tl1at the founding discussions of direct taxes typically focused 
on tl10se two categories, the most familiar forms of direct taxation at the 
time. Nevertheless, Professor Ackerman would have us infer from 
comments like this, and from dicta in Hylton v. United States,35 that 
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 21, supra note 17, at 110-111 (emphasis added). 
32 Wilson, supra note 15, at 245; see alro]ames Wilson, Speech (Pa. State House, Oct. 6, 1787), 
reprinted in FRIENDS, supra note 15, at 102, 106 ("[T] he great revenue of the United States must, 
and always will, be raised by impost; for, being at once less obnoxious, and more productive, the. 
interest of the government will be best promoted by the accommodation of the people."). 
33 In the antebellum period, Congress did enact some explicitly direct taxes on real estate, 
meticulously satisfying the apportionment requirement. See jensen, supra note 3, at 2355 n.liO. 
34 See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 4 (referring to "No capitation, or other direct, Tax"). 
35 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). Hylton considered the constitutionality of a taxon carriages, and 
statements limiting "direct taxes" to real-estate and capitation taxes therefore go far beyond what 
was necessary to decide the case. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2351-52. The language can be found at 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase,].), id. at 183 (Iredell,].), id. at 177 (Paterson,].). I 
understand that Supreme Court dictum is not to be taken lightly, but I emphasize this point because 
viewing Hylton as reasoned support for the validity of taxes that could not have been contemplated 
in 1796 reads far too much into the case. 
I remain unpersuaded that Hylton deserves reverence. There is little reasoning in the opinions, 
and much of what there is is contradictory. See jensen, supra note 3, at 2354-57. Ackerman ridicules 
my statement that "the Court was made up of Federalists sympathetic to a Federalist government," 
id at 2361, as "a remarkable put-down - after all, tl1e Federalists were the guys who got the 
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nothing else can be a direct tax. The "taxes" specified in the general 
taxing power are boundless,36 argues Ackerman, limited only by the 
ingenuity of man, and "direct taxes" form a very small partoftaxes. 37 As 
a result, the direct-tax rule was intended to apply to very little. 
For practical purposes, Ackerman's analysis boils down to a simple 
scheme. Any tax is presumed to be permissible without limitation. 
Unless the tax is one that the founders specified in their comments as 
being subject to the apportionment rule - capitation and real-estate 
taxes- the rule does not apply.38 
Professor Ackerman gets the structure upside down. His conception 
appears reasonable only if we assume the conclusion. We conclude the 
taxing power was intended to be all-encompassing because we assume 
the taxing power was intended to be all-encompassing. An 
unapportioned tax on the ownership of kitchen tables? The founders 
did not specifically discuss such a tax, so it must be OK? Try making that 
argument to the Connecticut ratifying convention. 
Return to the thought experiment with which I began this article. 
Let us analyze the structure of the taxing clauses from a more 
historically plausible starting point. We founders realize that the taxing 
power has to be increased, but we are worried about abuse of the new 
nation's taxing power. 39 Even if we personally favor unlimited power for 
the national government, that is not going to be marketable to the 
American people. We understand that the American people will not 
accept the idea that any as-yet-unknown forms of taxation are 
automatically acceptable. We are comfortable that some taxes are safe, 
but we think it necessary to limit the application of other taxes. Into 
Constitution ratified!" and "inaccurate." Ackerman, supra note 1, at 54. Remarkable it may be, but 
it is not inaccurate. The Court was not made up of independent scholars dispassionately viewing the 
~ acts of government. The Justices' task, as they understood it, was to support the Federalist 
government, not to keep the legislative and executive branches in check. See William R. Casto, Oliver 
Ellsworth, in SERI.f\ TIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARsHALL 292, 316 (Scott Douglas Gerber 
ed., 1998). "The justices of the early Supreme Court simply did not view their positions the way 
modern justices do." Id. at 315. 
36 U.S. CON ST. art. I,§ 8, d. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises .... "). 
37 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 14 (using Venn diagrams). But see infra note 40 (explaining why 
Ackerman's diagrams are misleading). 
38 We have to rely on the founders' comments about capitation and real-estate taxes because, 
inconveniendy, the Constitution contains no language even hinting at such a limitation. 
39 The taxing power is feared for several reasons, not the least of which is that an excessive 
national taxing power could destroy the states' tax bases and thus destroy the federal system. See 
Jensen, supra note 3, at 2396-402. 
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which of the two broad categories - those subject to limitations and 
those not- should new forms presumptively fit? 
The answer should be apparent. Unless the new tax has the built-in 
protections that indirect taxes have, the tax should be cabined. The 
operative question is this: does the proposed tax contain the protections 
against abuse that are characteristic of indirect taxes? If not, it should 
be subject to the apportionment rule. I will forgo the opportunity to 
draw a Venn diagram to make this point, but I invite all those who want 
the illusion of scientific rigor to do so. 40 
All of that makes sense of constitutional text and structure, and 
making sense is generally a good thing. But it does not satisfY Professor 
Ackerman, who criticizes me for defining "direct taxes" by exclusion: 
Much ofhis argument hinges on a stipulative definition. 
Curiously, Professor Jensen's lengthy article does not 
present an affirmative definition of"direct" taxation that 
distinguishes it from other kinds. Instead, he treats his 
central concept as if it were a broad umbrella term that 
includes any tax that is not "indirect." Worse yet, he 
presents a narrow definition of this second label, thereby 
maximizing the sweep of his umbrella-term .... 41 
40 See Ackerman, supra note I, at I4. Professor Ackerman uses Venn diagrams to show that the 
term "direct taxes" was intended to cover very little. He juxtaposes the language of the broad grant 
of taxing power, U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I, with the direct-tax clause found in Article I, Section 2, 
and states, "Notice the lack of parallelism between these two clauses: Congress must impose unifarm 
duties, imposts, and excises, but it is granted an unlimited power to levy 'taxes.'" Ackerman, supra 
note I, at I 4. This leads, he suggests, to "an obvious question: Are the 'direct taxes' regulated by the 
three-fifths compromise only a small part of the more general grant ofpowerto impose 'taxes' by 
Section 8?" !d. Two Venn diagrams, one showing "direct taxes" as a "small part" of"taxes"- the 
diagram we are supposed to pick as the right one- and one showing "direct taxes" as coinciding 
with "taxes," supposedly illustrate this "obvious" question. 
The question is not obvious, at least not in the form Ackerman asks it. If the choice makes any 
sense at all, it is between "a part" and "all," not between "a small part" and "all." Moreover, if we 
draw the associated Venn diagram to show a "not so small part," the two diagrams are not 
alternatives. They make a similar point in different ways. "Direct taxes" form a subset of"taxes," 
because the broader term was generally understood to also encompass indirect taxes, the "duties, 
imposts, and excises" subject to the uniformity rule. That gives us diagram number I. (We can fight 
about how large the subset of direct taxes should be compared to the subset of indirect taxes, 
remembering that indirect taxes were expected to be the primary revenue source. See supra notes 
I5-I6 and accompanying text.) But if we understand "taxes" not to include "duties, imposts, and 
excises," then the term includes only direct taxes. That is the second diagram. 
41 Ackerman, supra note I, at 53. 
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I plead guilty to most counts of this very peculiar indictment.42 I 
came up with some attributes that are characteristic of direct taxes -
imposed directly on individuals, not thought likely to be shiftable, very 
different from requisitions, etc.43 - but I concede that my definition of 
"direct taxes" depends on the definition of "indirect taxes." 
What I do not understand is why that is supposed to be a defect. 
Professor Ackerman's idea that only affirmative definitions should be 
given legal weight is interesting, but I have no idea where it comes from. 
We reasonably define terms by exclusion all the time in the law. 44 The 
proposition that a direct tax is a tax that is not an indirect tax has 
content, and it has a lot more affirmative, reasoned content than the 
proposition that the term "direct taxes" could have meant only 
capitation and real-estate taxes. 45 
At one point, Professor Ackerman accuses me of making "hash" of 
constitutional text, 46 even though I have outlined a structure that is 
consistent with the text. In contrast, Ackerman has no difficulty in 
concluding that the phrase "capitation, or other direct, Tax"47 meant 
only capitation and real-estate taxes. So instead of writing "capitation 
and real-estate taxes," or something similar, to reflect their narrow 
understanding, the drafters used open-ended language.48 Of course. 
42 I plead not guilty to narrowly defining "indirect taxes." Given that the founders assumed 
those taxes would be the exclusive source of revenue in peacetime, the definition is hardly narrow. 
See id. at 54 n.218; see also Wilson, supra note 15. 
I do not know how to plead on the "stipulative" definition count; I am not sure what that means. 
If Professor Ackerman intends to suggest that I simply stated the definition without any support or 
reasoning, he is just wrong. · 
43 Sr.ejensen, supra note 3, at 2337-38, 2390, 2402. 
44 Indeed, some commentators draw Venn diagrams in the process of doing so. See, e.g., 
Ackerman, supra note 1, at 14 (effectively defining taxes that are not direct taxes as a relevant 
constitutional category). 
45 Since I am so bewildered by the idea that a "definition" has to be "affirmative" to be 
authoritative, I am not even sure what the problem with a nonaffirmative definition is supposed to 
be. When he introduced the direct-tax apportionment language at the constitutional convention, 
Gouverneur Morris, complains Ackerman, did not supply an "affirmative theory of' directness' that 
might be used to determine the status of countless other taxes left unmentioned." Id. at 10. But, 
the definition by exclusion- direct taxes are not indirect taxes- determines the status of other taxes 
quite well. Yes, there are classification problems at the margin, but that is true with any legal rule of 
significance. 
46 I d. at 53. 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
48 Professor Ackerman suggests that the "other direct, Tax" language was an afterthought, 
intended to deal with concern about the power of the national government to force delinquent 
states to satisfy their obligations under the requisitions system of the Articles of Confederation. We 
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Ackerman then argues that real-estate taxes should drop out of the 
category of direct taxes today. 49 "Other" direct taxes would be, well, 
nothing. Ackerman may have cooked up the filet mignon of 
constitutional text, but I will stick with hash, thank you very much. 
B. The Federalist No. 36 and "Affirmative" Definitions 
Professor Ackerman rejects my argument that the universe of taxes is 
divided into direct and indirect taxes, and that direct taxes are those 
levies that are not indirect. I could be wrong here, but ifl am, it is not 
because of anything Ackerman has pointed to. Indeed, Professor 
Ackerman is incredibly sloppy in his use of materials. Ackerman's brief 
discussion of The Federalist No. 36, which he uses to denigrate my work, 
illustrates sloppiness that borders on misrepresentation. 
I had written that, "in The Federalist No. 36, Alexander Hamilton 
contrasted direct and indirect taxes. By indirect taxes 'must be 
understood duties and excises on articles of consumption.' Direct taxes 
are, presumably, everything else."50 Professor Ackerman italicizes the 
"presumably" and, cutely, notes this "keyword, which presumably allows 
Jensen to discount the fact that Publius's affirmative discussion of 
'direct' taxation focuses only on capitation and real estate!"51 In a 
footnote, Ackerman expands on 
a systematic tendency in Professor Jensen's original 
sources - every time a speaker gives a few examples of 
"indirect" taxation, Professor Jensen assumes that other 
forms of taxation have been excluded from this category. 
But this is simply a non sequitur- the mere fact that I 
exemplify the term "mammal" by telling you that dogs 
and cats qualify does not imply that elephants aren't 
mammals. Yet this is precisely the implication that 
Professor Jensen would have us draw.52 
therefore should not read too much into the language. See Ackerman, supra note I, at I3 ("The 
second direct tax clause took on its canonical form ... only at the last minute."). I would be more 
comfortable with this form of argument if Ackerman did not suggest that lack of perfect precision in 
other clauses is significant. See, e.g., id. at I5. 
49 See id. at 58. 
50 Jensen, supra note 3, at 2395 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 2I9 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossitered., I96I)). 
51 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 54. 
52 !d. at II n.36. 
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Professor Ackerman is right to ridicule my use of "presumably"; what 
I wrote was accurate without qualification. But Ackerman's more 
general point would be fair only (1) if the speakers and writers had not 
often explained what indirect taxes are, not just given examples, and 
explained why such taxes are not dangerous in a way that other taxes are 
- that is, if they had not given us an "affirmative" theory of "indirect 
taxes"; (2) if the distinction drawn did not fit constitutional text -
indirect taxes are the duties, imposts, and excises governed by the 
uniformity rule - much better than Ackerman's "anything goes" 
interpretation; and (3) if Ackerman were not using capitation and real-
estate taxes as dogs and cats in support of the historically absurd 
proposition that the founders really did not want to limit taxing power. 
As it is, I did not "assume" much of anything. I spelled out the 
definition of "indirect taxes," a definition that can be derived from 
Hamilton's Federalist writings as well as from many other sources. The 
language from The Federalist No. 36 that I quoted, and that Professor 
Ackerman makes fun of, accurately conveys the original conception of 
indirect taxes. 
To show how misleading Professor Ackerman's reference to The 
Federalist No. 36 is, I would like to examine a larger part of the passage 
from which I quoted: 
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general 
denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into 
those of the direct and those ofthe indirect kind. Though 
the objection53 be made to both, yet the reasoning upon 
it seems to be confined to the former branch. And 
indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood 
duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a 
loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties 
apprehended. 54 
53 The objection alluded to has to do with the ability of the national government to enact and 
administer taxes in a way that takes local differences into account: "that a power of internal 
taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want 
of a sufficient knowledge oflocal circumstances as from an interference between the revenue laws 
of the Union and of the particular States." THE FEDERALIST No. 36 at 186, (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
54 Jd. at 187. 
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Let us parse that paragraph. Internal taxes are subdivided into direct 
and indirect, which is almost exactly what I said.55 An internal tax 
should be classified as one or the other; that is tlle way the structure is 
set up. 56 An addict ofVenn diagrams could make the point graphically, 
dividing the universe of internal taxes into two subsets. 57 One subset is 
indirect taxes, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of 
consumption. That is not the language of example, particularly when 
read in context; it is the language of definition. 
If that language is not clear enough, reread the lengthy passage I 
quoted earlier from The Federalist No. 21, which discusses the "nature of 
things."58 And here is an excerpt from The Federalist No. 12: 
In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct 
taxes from superior wealth must be much more 
tolerable, and from the vigor of the government, much 
more practicable than in America, far the greatest part 
of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect 
kind, from imposts and from excises. Duties on imported 
articles form a large branch of this latter description. 59 
Duties, imposts, and excises are the levies subject to the uniformity 
rule, 5° and therefore not subject to apportionment. 
Perhaps some other taxes are not governed by the apportionment 
55 I also included imposts (usually referred to as external taxes, when a distinction was being 
drawn with internal taxes) in the category of indirect taxes; support for that proposition can be 
found in many sources. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999); THE FEDERALIST No. 21, supra note I 7, at 11 I. I admit to failing to define 
"taxes," as distinguished from other governmental exactions, such as users fees. If one is going to 
divide the world of taxes up into two or more parts, one needs a better idea than I (or Professor 
Ackerman) provided of what the boundaries of that world are. CJ Ackerman, supra note 1, at 43-
44 (discussing use of "taxes" for purely regulatory purposes). 
56 I suppose Professor Ackerman could say that the language from The Federalist No. J6leaves 
open the possibility of still other subdivisions of internal taxes- that is, taxes that are neither direct 
nor indirect. He could say it, but that would be an extremely strained interpretation of the 
passage. 
57 With, perhaps, a residual category. See infra Part IV. 
58 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
59 THEF'EDERALISTN0.12, at61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered.,1999) (emphasis 
added). In our evaluation of his wealth tax scheme, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, I am 
sure Professor Ackerman would want us to ignore Hamilton's reference to "direct taxes from 
superior wealth." 
fiO U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 
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rule, but it is impossible to read these materials as suggesting anything 
like the interpretation of "direct taxes" that Professor Ackerman 
advances. The distinction I emphasized in my article was not made up; 
it was derived from the constitutipnal text and debates. 
II. SLAVERY AND THE DIRECT-TAX CLAUSES 
To Professor Ackerman, the direct-tax clauses had no purpose other 
than to facilitate a constitutional compromise with slavery, and that taint 
inevitably affects our understanding of those clauses. Ackerman refers 
to my "eighty-four-page article devot[ing] but one paragraph to the 
interpretive problems raised by the tainted origins of the clauses,"61 and 
then quotes that one paragraph: 
Some have suggested that the apportionment rule was 
merely an accidental byproduct of the fight about how 
slaves should be counted for purposes of representation 
-that it has little content because it was not the focus of 
the real controversy swirling through the constitutional 
convention. But it is absurd to conclude that, because 
the apportionment rule was part of a compromise, it was 
a meaningless requirement. Compromises work only if 
the components of the compromise have value to the 
disputing parties. And it is equally absurd to conclude, 
as some have, that, because the apportionment rule was 
part of a compromise with slavery and slavery has ended, 
any reason to enforce the apportionment rule has 
disappeared. Is there a reason to conclude that 
constitutional provisions lose their force because other 
historically related provisions have been amended? 
What would be left of the Constitution - a principled 
document, to be sure, but one full of compromises - if 
such an interpretational rule were followed?62 
Ackerman writes, "This intemperate formulation misses the mark. The 
question is not whether the 'direct tax' clauses should 'lose their force,' 
but whether the repeal of slavery should lead courts to construe their 
61 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 52. 
62 I d. at 52-53 (quoting Jensen, supra note 3, at 2385). 
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meaning narrowly."63 
Professor Ackerman says I miss the mark, and I do miss his point. 
Remember that Ackerman's "narrow" construction of the direct-tax 
clauses leads to the ultimate conclusion that they should "rest in 
peace. "64 Therefore, if the question Ackerman raises makes any sense at 
all, he must see a distinction of constitutional significance between 
clauses' "losing their force" and clauses' "resting in peace." Until the 
distinction is explained to me, however, I will stand by that 
"intemperate" paragraph. 
I concede the obvious. Without some compromises on slavery, there 
would have been no Constitution, and one of those compromises was 
reflected in the direct-tax clauses. Linking direct taxation and 
representation through the apportionment rule, with the three-fifths 
counting rule for slaves used for both, was a way to effect a compromise 
and keep the Convention going. And because slaves were thought of 
either as real property or as enhancing the value of real property, it was 
often assumed that explicitly direct taxes on real property would include 
taxes on slaves. 65 
But I do not agree with what Professor Ackerman says must follow 
from those connections, that "there is no longer a constitutional point 
in enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power."66 I do not concede 
that the direct-tax clauses are so fundamentally tainted that they should 
automatically "lose their force"- or "rest in peace." 
To begin with, there is nothing in the idea of direct taxation that is 
necessarily connected with slavery. The term describes a particular type 
of taxation that is different from the classic forms of indirect taxation. It 
need not have any slavery overtones at all, 67 and, quite apart from any 
concern about slavery, a rational draftsman in 1787 could have 
concluded that the direct-tax power- indeed, the full national taxing 
63 I d. at 53. 
64 I d. at 3. 
65 That turned out to be the case. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2355 n.IIO, 2364 & n.159. 
66 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 31, 58. 
67 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. V, ch. III, para. 1 
(Jonathan Riley ed., 1994) (1848): 
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded 
from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect 
taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and 
intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another: such as 
the excise or customs. 
Not a mention of slavery, from a strong opponent of the practice. 
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power- needed to be constrained. 
Professor Ackerman must believe that, had it not been for slavery, 
there would have been no desire to limit the national taxing power, 
except for the uniformity rule. The delegates in Philadelphia would 
have concluded that, in a world without slavery, the national 
government should be able to impose whatever taxes (including 
capitation taxes and real-estate taxes) it wishes without limitation. That 
position is, as a historical matter, incredible. 
Ackerman writes, "After all, there is no reason to believe that the 
'direct tax' clauses would have been written into the Constitution except 
to resolve the problem of slavery. "68 At one level, that is probably true; 
the limitation on direct taxation would not have taken the form it did 
had it not been for slavery. It hardly follows, however, that, without 
slavery, the founders would have been indifferent to the national taxing 
power. One of the reasons this particular limitation worked as a 
compromise was that it had teeth - it made direct taxes difficult to 
impose- and it had teeth however slaves were counted. 59 
Most important, Professor Ackerman's proposition that constitutional 
provisions tainted by slavery should be construed narrowly creates 
extraordinary interpretive problems. Given that the Constitution 
(including the Bill of Rights) is a bundle of compromises, many 
provisions can be considered tainted; indeed, some see the whole 
68 Ackerman, supra note l. at 28. 
69 With admiration, Professor Ackerman quotes Justice Harlan's dissent in the Income Tax Cases, 
that the Court "so interprets constitutional provisions, originally designed to protect the slave 
property against oppressive taxation, as to give pri\~leges and immunities, never contemplated by 
the founders of the government." !d. at 29 n.109 (quoting Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 684 (1895) 
(Harlan,]., dissenting)). We are to assume, I take it, that the founders were otherwise indifferent 
to "oppressive taxation." 
Professor Ackerman's discussion of slavery is another example of his imaginative use of 
alternative arguments. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. I had thought we were 
supposed to reject the terms of the compromise about counting slaves because of the slavery taint, 
but at times Ackerman writes as though there were no substantive compromise at alL See supra 
note 18. For example, the direct-tax language introduced by Gouverneur Morris "offered symbolic 
satisfaction[.) serv[ing) as a fig-leaf for anti-slavery Northerners." Ackerman, supra note 1, at 10. 
The language should be disregarded, that is, because tying representation and direct-taxation was, 
in form, anti-slavery, but just to placate the rubes back home. 
A suggestion that the com promise was substantively meaningless is difficult to take seriously, 
for many reasons. Gouverneur Morris came to regret the direct-tax language he had introduced, 
which he said he introduced to keep the convention from breaking up- "as a bridge to assist us 
over a certain gulph." FARRAND, supra note 26, at 106. His dismay arose because the language 
developed a life of its own; it was thought to have substantive effect. 
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document as irredeemably tainted. 70 That conception provides the 
opportunity for enterprising scholars to call for the repudiation of one 
constitutional provision after another, but it makes it difficult to deal 
with the Constitution in the real world. 
With a complex document consisting of dozens of interrelated 
provisions, which provisions should survive? Which should fan? The 
compromise concerning the counting of slaves also involved 
representation in the House ofRepresentatives.71 What does that fact 
do to our understanding of the House? Do we interpret its powers 
narrowly?72 Questions like these jump out at the reader, but Ackerman 
devotes not a single paragraph to the interpretive problems raised by his 
theory. 
The conundrums created by Professor Ackerman's interpretive 
principle are exemplified by his own discussion. Ackerman praises 
Justice Paterson's opinion in Hylton v. United States, which concluded 
that the direct-tax clauses should be interpreted narrowly: 
[The Constitution] was the work of compromise. The 
rule of apportionment is of this nature; it is radically 
wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning. 
Why should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented 
more than any other property? The rule, therefore, ought not 
to be extended by construction.73 
This, writes Ackerman, shows the "inconsistency [of the direct-tax 
clauses] with basic principles of national community established by the 
Convention."74 
Reread that passage. Professor Ackerman uses an opinion based on 
the notion of slaves as property to support his argument that the direct-
70 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1987). 
71 It ought to be relevant to our understanding of the compromise that counting slaves worked 
against the South in the direct-tax provisions, but for the South in determining representation. See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (discussing built-in 
tension between the apportionment rule for taxation and the apportionment rule for 
representation). Read together, the apportionment rules for taxation and for representation are 
not pro-slavery. 
72 This must be the one constitutional argument missed in the recent impeachment 
controversy. Next time, maybe. 
73 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 178, quoted in Ackerman, supra note 1, at 22 (emphasis added). 
74 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 55 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 22-23. 
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tax clauses should be narrowly construed! Moreover, suggests Ackerman, 
this is one of the "basic principles of national community." If we are 
going to toss authority that has been corrupted by slavery into the 
"dustbin of constitutional history" - Ackerman's phrase - Justice 
Paterson's Hylton opinion ought to be on its way to the dumpster. 
Professor Ackerman does not want that to happen, of course, so a 
skeptical reader cannot help concluding that his tainted-by-slavery rule is 
being applied selectively. 
Frederick Douglass's conception of the relationship between slavery 
and the Constitution is far more compelling than Professor Ackerman's: 
I hold that the Federal Government was never, in its 
essence, anything but an anti-slavery government. 
Abolish slavery tomorrow, and not a sentence or syllable 
of the Constitution need be altered. It was purposely 
framed as to give no claim, no sanction to the claim, of 
property in man. If in its origin slavery had any relation 
to the government, it was only as the scaffolding to the 
magnificent structure, to be removed as soon as the 
building was completed. 75 
III. "TAXES ON INCOMES" AND DIRECT-CONSUMPTION TAXES 
In my article I concluded that some proposed forms of consumption 
taxes are direct taxes, as historically understood. If not apportioned, 
those taxes- in particular, the Forbes-Armey-Hall-Rabushka flat tax and 
the Nunn-Domenici USA tax76 - would therefore fail constitutional 
requirements, unless they would be treated as "taxes on incomes" under 
the Sixteenth Amendment.77 In the course of my argument, I suggested 
75 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Address for the Promotion of Colored Enlistrrumtr (July 6, 1863), in THE LIFE 
AND WRJTINGSOFFREDERJCKDOUGLASS365 (PhilipS. Fonered., 1950); if. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, 
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 27 (1978) ("It is as 
though the framers were half-consciously trying to frame two constitutions, one fortheirown time 
and the other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally- that is, plainly visible at their feet, but 
disappearing when they lifted their eyes."). 
76 These taxes are briefly described in Jensen, supra note 3, at 2403-04. Unlike the classic 
indirect tax, which is imposed on articles of consumption, each of these proposed direct-
consumption taxes would fall directly on individuals, who would be required to complete returns 
to report their annual tax liabilities. Both are consumption (rather than income) taxes because 
they would effectively exempt saved income from taxation. 
77 
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
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that the term "taxes on incomes," which describes those direct taxes not 
subject to the apportionment rule, is not completely open-ended, and 
that the Amendment does not seem to destroy the importance of the 
direct-iax clauses. 78 
Professor Ackerman questions those conclusions. For Ackerman, the 
Sixteenth Amendment was unnecessary, and it should have no limiting 
effect on national power today. If Hylton and the Civil War Amendments 
did not bury the direct-tax clauses, the New Deal Revolution did. 79 And 
Ackerman sees the Sixteenth Amendment as part of a great popular 
uprising to repudiate the Income Tax Cases.80 As a result, the taxing 
power is all-encompassing; worrying about specific language in an 
Amendment championed by the American People is a misguided 
enterprise: "When the People mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems 
particularly inappropriate for the Justices to respond in a niggling 
fashion." 81 
It seems particularly inappropriate, that is, for the Justices to try to 
understand the language ("taxes on incomes") and purposes of the 
Sixteenth Amendment. Grand Abstractions beat the nitty, gritty of 
textual analysis any time. 
If Professor Ackerman is right about the demise of the direct-tax 
clauses, the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment does not matter. 
However, on the off chance that those clauses might be important, if 
only because they are in the Constitution, the meaning of the 
Amendment could also matter. I will not attempt a full defense of 
Sixteenth Amendment text here, but a few comments are in order. 
First, it should not be necessary to encourage lawyers, even 
constitutional lawyers, to care about language, but let me hesitantly 
suggest that constitutional text matters. The term selected by the 
drafters was "taxes on incomes"; the Amendment was a response to the 
Income Tax Cases, which had struck down an income tax; and it is not 
intuitive that "taxes on incomes" has no meaning whatsoever. 
Second, even those proponents of the view that Congress has 
unlimited power to define what "incomes" means have, as far as I can 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
78 Jensen, supra note 3, at 2342-45,2408-14. 
79 See Ackerman, supra note I, at 51-53. 
80 See id. at 55. 
81 !d. 
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tell, assumed that Congress would make some attempt to do just that- to 
define "incomes. "82 If Congress enacts an unapportioned tax that 
Congress does not even pretend is a tax on incomes, it is not obvious 
why that tax should be protected by the Sixteenth Amendment.83 
Third, I am skeptical that Ackerman's American People meant to 
eliminate all restrictions on the taxing power. The push for an income 
tax in the late nineteenth century was to insure that the wealthy would 
bear a larger share of the tax burden than had been true under prior 
consumption-tax regimes.84 If there was a popular uprising in 
connection with the Sixteenth Amendment, it was to validate an income 
tax that would affect a very small part of the population. 85 It was a mass 
movement to tax the "man behind that tree."86 To suggest that the 
American People, with or without capital letters, have ever been 
sympathetic to unconstrained taxing power is silly. 87 
Fourth, I question Professor Ackerman's conclusion that the judicial 
authority treating the Sixteenth Amendment as a text worthy of 
interpretation has died a quiet death. In particular, I question the 
reported demise of the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Eisner v. 
Macomber, 88 which on Sixteenth Amendment grounds struck down the 
application of an unapportioned income tax to a totally proportionate 
stock dividend (that is, a stock dividend that made no change in the 
shareholders' proportionate interests in the assets and earnings of the 
distributing corporation). The income tax was held to be a direct tax in 
Macomber, and the five:Justice majority concluded that the stock dividend 
82 See, e.g., Maljorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of 
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1992) ("[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully 
vested power to tax all income, however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine 
distinctions."); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 101 (1990) ("[T]he 
common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which must be left to the 
judgment of Congress. The same should apply to the meaning of income in the sixteenth 
amendment."). 
83 That is why there is a legitimate concern about the constitutionality of a direct-consumption 
tax. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2407-14. 
84 See id. at 2412. 
85 The 1894 income tax struck down in the Income Tax Cases directly affected only about one 
percent of the population. See id. at 2343 n.4l. 
86 I refer to the ditty, attributed to former Senator Russell Long, that characterizes the average 
citizen's view of the tax system: "Don't tax him and don't tax me, but tax that man behind that tree." 
Quoted in Charles 0. Galvin, It's VAT Time Again, 21 TAX NOTES 275, 277 ( 1983). 
87 I concede that the Sixteenth Amendment supports a broad-based income tax; I merely mean 
to suggest that the American People were hardly marching for unlimited taxation. 
88 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
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was not income taxable to the shareholders under the authority of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.89 
Professor Ackerman concludes, with strong academic support, that 
Macomber would be decided differently today.90 Mter the New Deal 
Revolution, Macomber survives on the books only because there has been 
no reason to formally overrule it. The constitutional "revolution ... 
accounts for the fact that Macomber has been followed by seventy-five 
years of judicial silence- silence that could allow lawyers unacquainted 
with the larger history to take its dicta at face value."91 In short, 
Macomber is dead, Ackerman argues, and Congress can tax whatever it 
wants without limitation. 
But the purported interment of Macomber is not nearly as clear as 
Professor Ackerman suggests. For one thing, the Supreme Court 
continues to cite Macomber as if the case stands for something.92 
Moreover, although Professor Ackerman is right that, in general, 
academics assume Macomber to be dead today, it is not as though 
constitutional lawyers and tax lawyers have focused their critical energies 
on the case. 
Ackerman sees ignorance as bliss, particularly where tax lawyers are 
concerned: 
[T)his benign neglect is par for the course for 
modem tax lawyers. Despite the impoverished analysis, 
the modem scholarly consensus is clear- a good lawyer 
relies on Macomber at her peril. 
This is also true in Congress. There are a number of 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that would be 
unconstitutional if Macomberwere good law. None has 
been seriously questioned on constitutional grounds.93 
I am not convinced. Most of the silence reflects nothing at all about 
the merits of constitutional analysis. 94 Tax lawyers, by and large, think 
89 See id. at 219. 
90 See Ackerman, supra note I. at 51-52. 
91 !d. at 52. 
92 See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1991). 
93 Ackerman, supra note I, at 52 (footnote omitted). 
94 There have been suggestions, maybe even serious ones, that Macombi?Tis alive. See, e.g., Leon 
Gabinet & Ronald]. Coffey, The Limitations of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholiler 
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that constitutional law is mumbojumbo, and even litigating tax lawyers 
know that one makes constitutional arguments as a last resort. 
Furthermore, as Professor Ackerman undoubtedly k.1ows, tax lawyers are 
smart enough to work around, and occasionally take advantage of, many 
of the arguably unconstitutional Code provisions he refers to. 
Ignoring Macomber might be more understandable if Professor 
Ackerman would explain why it is so obvious that the result in the case 
was wrong. 95 If you were to ask a typical tax lawyer whether receipt of a 
totally proportionate stock dividend ought to be a ta.xable event, he 
would not be thinking in constitutional terms- he would not have to, 
because the Internal Revenue Code is clear today that these stock 
dividends are not taxable96 - but his position would be unequivocal. 
This is not income; there is nothing that should be taxed. 
Professor Ackerman implies that Macomber stands by itself, that it was 
an aberrational decision, but that is not true. Many cases after 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment stated, and not always in dicta, 
that the term "incomes" constrains congressional power.97 Given the 
New Deal Revolution and the American People, the existence of these 
Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 895, 919 (1977) ("We think it too cavalier and 
unconstructive to assume that the sixteenth amendment was not meant to convey some univocal 
meaning, by which the permissible unapportioned tax could be distinguished from other direct 
taxes."). 
95 Professor Ackerman is "not interested in appraising Uustice] Pitney's understandings of 
corporate finance, but rather in the pattern of his constitutional argument" in Macomber. Ackerman, 
supra note 1, at 42. Unless one has assumed the conclusion, however - that the Sixteenth 
Amendment is boundless- the facts and the constitutional argument are not easily separable. 
96 Seel.R.C. § 305(a) (CCH 2000). 
97 See Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (holding that subsidies to railroad 
company were not taxable because they "were not profits or gains from the use or operation of the 
railroad, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment"); id. at 
631-32 (noting that the "Sixteenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to 
be taken as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language 
used"); see also Helve ring v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371,378 ( 1934) ("The rental value of the 
building used by the owner does not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment."); Taftv. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470,481 (1929) ("Under former decisions here the settled 
doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as 
income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly 
regarded as income."); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 173 (1926) ("It was not the 
purpose or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power."); 
Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) ("In determining the 
definition of the word 'income,' ... this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements 
oflexicographers or economists and has approved, in the definitions quoted, what it believed to be 
the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of people when 
they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."). 
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cases will not convince Professor Ackerman, of course, but it ought to 
temper his one-sided enthusiasm.98 
I do not want to overstate my position; Professor Ackerman is right 
that the continuing vitality of Macomber is subject to doubt. But he 
certainly does not present an open-and-shut case. And, as he does 
throughout his article, Ackerman uses some baffling arguments to 
support his conclusions. 
Most baffling is Ackerman's praise for Justice Holmes's dissent in 
Macomber, where Holmes suggested that the Sixteenth Amendment 
effectively repealed the direct-tax clauses: "The known purpose of the 
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct 
taxes .... "99 We should pay attention to Holmes's unreasoned view, 
Ackerman argues, because "we can never recapture the directness of his 
lived experience of the [Sixteenth Amendment's] ratification 
campaign."100 And, Ackerman notes, "we are left with Holmes's ipse 
dixits concerning original understanding - certainly an important 
resource, but one that may be too easily dismissed by readers who have 
not themselves lived through the process of amendment ratification. "101 
It is hard to believe Professor Ackerman is serious. We are supposed 
to pay particular attention to Holmes's views because Holmes was alive 
while the Amendment was being ratified? What exactly was Holmes 
doing that made his "lived experience" so valuable? Let us not overlook 
the obvious. All members of the Macomber Court, including the five 
Justices in the majority, were breathing during ratification - a process 
that ended only seven years before the case was decided. 
N. PROFESSOR ACKERMAN'S STRIKING CONTRIBUTION TO TAXING 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
Although Professor Ackerman's article is largely reactive -.why the 
direct-tax rules should be ignored- I am intrigued by a possibility that 
arises from his close reading of the taxing clauses in Article I, Section 8 
98 Ackerman writes that we have had "a long period of judicial silence extending from the I920s 
through today." Ackerman, supra note I, at46 (footnote omitted). I tis true that the Court has not 
struck down a tax on constitutional grounds since the 1920s, but it has suggested that it might. See 
Helve ring v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 37!, 378 (I934). 
99 252 u.s. I89, 220 (I920). 
100 Ackerman, supra note I, at 45. 
101 /d. at 45-46. 
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of the Constitution. Ackerman has implicitly resurrected an old idea 
that could have striking practical consequences. 
Start with the taxing clause: "The Congress shall have Power to lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises, shall be uniform throughout 
the United States."102 With a close reading of this text, Professor 
Ackerman shows how one can reasonably conclude that "taxes" are 
different from "duties, imposts, and excises" (the only levies apparently 
subject to the uniformity rule). And he argues that direct taxes are a 
small subset of the larger category of "taxes."103 
Think what this means. There are taxes that are not direct taxes and 
therefore need not be apportioned, and because they are taxes, rather 
than duties, imposts, and excises, they should not be subject to the 
uniformity rule: 104 "Congress must impose uniform duties, imposts, and 
excises, but it is granted an unlimited power to levy 'taxes.'" 105 These 
taxes then can vary from state to statefl06 
It is not a new idea that some taxes might be immune from both the 
apportionment requirement and the uniformity rule. Justice Story, for 
example, noted that 
two rules are prescribed, the rule of apportionment ... 
for direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity for duties, 
imposts, and excises. If there are any other kinds of 
taxes, not embraced in one or the other of these two 
classes, (and it is certainly difficult to give full effect to 
the words of the constitution without supposing them to 
exist), it would seem, that congress is left at full liberty to 
levy the same by either rule, or by a mixture of both 
rules, or perhaps by any other rules not inconsistent with 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. 1. 
103 See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 14. 
104 I tis an ideal mentioned in my article, see jensen. supra note 3, at 2341 & n.36, but Professor 
Ackerman has implicitly fleshed out the textual argument. 
l05 Ackerman, supra note l, at 14. 
106 Professor Ackerman does not really believe this. Instead, he seems to assume that levies in 
general should be subject to the uniformity rule, see id. at 3, but that is not the way the constitutional 
text reads. In any event, why let something like the uniformity rule, which was part of the slavery-
tainted Constitution, get in the way of imaginative revenue planning? 
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the general purposes of the constitution.I07 
But Ackerman gives this idea new significance by the extraordinary 
scope he sees for "taxes" that are not "direct taxes"- almost everything. 
I am sure Professor Ackerman does not want to dispense with his 
idea of a national wealth tax, but this analysis suggests another way in 
which social justice can be advanced. Have taxes, including income 
taxes, hit hardest at the wealthiest states. 108 Why not tax the income of 
Connecticut residents at a rate much higher than that imposed on 
residents of Mississippi? Progressive rate structures do that now, in a 
way, but let us take the next step, a different rate structure for each state. 
Or better yet, let us impose some taxes on Connecticut residents that are 
not imposed on Mississippi residents at all. 
It is true this "would strike most Americans . . . as politically 
absurd,"109 but political absurdity should not get in the way of our 
constitutional imagination. Besides, if this seems to be an absurd 
constitutional result, we might have to reexamine the direct-tax clauses-
and take them seriously. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I confess to some discomfort in what could look like a defense of the 
direct-tax clauses on the merits. At best the apportionment rule is 
extremely cumbersome, a rather silly way to try to limit the national 
taxing power. If I were drafting a constitution from scratch, I would 
limit the taxing power but I would find another way to do it. Because I 
cannot do that, however, I performed the interpreter's function, trying 
to understand the direct-tax provisions in their most robust form. 
Original understanding is not everything, of course, and Professor 
Ackerman obviously does not value the exercise. However, if he is going 
to try to discern original understanding at all, he needs to be far more 
I 07 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENT ARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 73, at 339 
(Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (emphasis 
omitted). Justices Chase and Iredell made a similar suggestion in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 171, 173,181 (1796). 
108 The Supreme Court has determined that the income tax is subject to the uniformity rule, 
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1916), but Professor Ackerman's analysis shows 
why, as a matter of textual analysis, that is wrong. 
109 Professor Ackerman uses this term in describing the effect of the direct-tax apportionment 
rule. Ackerman, supra note I, at 2. 
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careful than he is in Taxation and the Constitution. Professor Ackerman's 
forceful language should not obscure the historical absurdity of his 
position. The idea that the taxing power was intended to be unlimited is 
as wrong as it can be, and any interpretation of the taxing power that 
depends on that historically misguided premise is hopelessly flawed. 
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APPENDIX 
The relevant taxing provisions of the Constitution are as follows: 
I. The general taxing power and the uniformity rule: "The Congress 
shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises; to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States: but all Duties, Imposts and Excises, shall be 
uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. I. 
2. The direct-tax clauses: 
a. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according to 
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to service for a 
Term ofYears, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, d. 3. 
b. "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 4. 
3. The income tax amendment (1913): "The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
